Archive for the ‘church’ Category
Here’s an interesting piece from the Wikipedia article on Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience on the question of the morality of structures of governance. He’s talking about the state here but it relates to the structures by which the Church chooses to govern itself.
Read Church instead of State and it points to an interesting future. (And no, I do not consider current Church governance “an act of God.”
Because government is man-made, not an element of nature or an act of God, Thoreau hoped that its makers could be reasoned with. As governments go, he felt, the U.S. government, with all its faults, was not the worst and even had some admirable qualities. But he felt we could and should insist on better. “The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual.… Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man? There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly.”
Tags: structures of governance
Besides its structures of governance, the organizational or corporate culture of the Church obviously makes a huge difference in the way the Church is run.
From Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_culture
“Organizational culture is an idea in the field of Organizational studies and management which describes the psychology, attitudes, experiences, beliefs and values (personal and cultural values) of an organization. It has been defined as “the specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization and that control the way they interact with each other and with stakeholders outside the organization.”
“This definition continues to explain organizational values also known as “beliefs and ideas about what kinds of goals members of an organization should pursue and ideas about the appropriate kinds or standards of behavior organizational members should use to achieve these goals. From organizational values develop organizational norms, guidelines or expectations that prescribe appropriate kinds of behavior by employees in particular situations and control the behavior of organizational members towards one another.”
Tags: structures of governance
Clearly this book has captured my attention. I think the reason I consider it so important is that it clarifies the precise points where the Church has gone wrong operationally since Vatican II and the arguments that support the judgment that the Church’s current direction is in fact out of of step with tradition and theologically untenable. Well worth the read to understand the history and to chart a path for reform in the future.
Tags: Orsy, structures of governance
We all need to become conversant in canon law; it’s the operating manual of the Church.
“The Spirit of God is the one who brings the church into existence and sustains it. The church, however, by divine design needs visible structures to be a community of human beings and to operate in a human way. This need is the foundation of the ecclesial vocation of canon lawyers: they are called to be partners of the Spirit in building structures for the unfolding kingdom of God in human history.” (p. 143)
“If laws are for the well-being of the community, as they should be, then all laws, secular and religious, are more than justice. They are manifestations of the love that the scholastics called amor benevolentiae, ‘love that wants to give,’ or ‘love that wants to enrich the other.’ Virtues do not exclude each other: they blend and integrate … Thus justice becomes love.” (p. 144)
“We know in retrospect that the reception of every major council has been slow and painful. So is the reception of Vatican Council II, all the more so because its insights have consequences in the practical order and postulate a conversion in the habits of human thoughts and operations. This is the price the community must pay in exchange for a deeper understanding of the mysteries and a more intense participation in them–and a blessed price it is.
“Yet there should be no doubt: it shall be a fruitful time. As the energies latent in our dedicated laity, in the episcopal college, and in the church of Christ (now suffering from disunity) are given scope, there will be an abundant harvest of good fruit for the benefit of all. Our hope is well founded: the Spirit has taken the initiative.” ” (p. 147-8)
We have the insights from Vatican II but need to build the structures and norms that will give full scope to those insights.
Tags: canon law, Orsy, structures of governance
In this chapter, Orsy addresses how the new papal invention of “definitive doctine” compromises the intellectual freedom necessary to properly develop doctrine. “… the demand for stability and the imperative of development are vital forces in any living community.” (p. 105)
He describes how you can tell when development of doctrine is healthy: it respects the foundations of the institution, shows a harmonious progress from the old to the new, the once hidden potentials of the old are revealed, it is filled with energy. If it is unhealthy, it destabilizes the foundations, has a corrosive impact on identity, undermines original principles, is a radical break, shows no vigor of life, and weakens the institution.
“The Code of Canon Law, promulgated in 1983, mandated a healthy balance between stability and development. It’s canon 750 stressed the importance of stability … Canon 218 asserted the imperative of development and the need for ‘just freedom’ in research …
The two canons together stated well the right and duty of the community–to preserve and to let evolve the evangelical doctrine. (p. 108)
Inventing Definitive Doctrine with Ad tuendam fidem
“This balance established by the Code of Canon Law, however, was changed in 1998 with the promulgation of the Motu Proprio Ad tuendam fidem. The letter introduced into, and imposed on, the church a new category of teaching, called ‘definitive,’ and explained it as not infallible but irreformable. Effectively, it not verbally, it transferred some freely debated doctrines from the field of ‘doubtful things’ to the field of the ‘necessary things,’ where no question must be raised anymore about their unchangeable nature. …
“Thus the document places each and every point of teaching that has been declared ‘definitive’ by the papal magisterium into the body of ‘the doctrine of the Catholic Church,’ even when such a declaration does not fulfill the stringent criteria of a papal definition …” In other words, is not infallible. (p. 108-9)
Ratzinger also wrote a Commentary (not part of it or signed by the CDF) listing examples of definitive doctrine, like no ordination for women, the invalidity of Anglican ordination, etc.
So now doctrine doesn’t have to be infallible to be “irreformable.” And sanctions were added to canon law to enforce observance of doctrines determined to be definitive. Gotta love it.
But Ad tuendam fidem itself is not infallible because it is not a solemn ex cathedra pronouncement. So even by the loony logic of infallibility, it isn’t infallible.
It extends doctrinal foundations beyond traditional limits by attributing “unchangeable permanency to doctrines to which the universal church has not committed itself infallibly.” (p. 112) Plus, it just basically made up the category of non-infallible but unchangeable. And it stifles real thought.
And you wonder why so many people think the church is nuts.
Tags: canon law, Orsy, structures of governance
Orsy sets secular legal wisdom side by side with how justice is administered in the church.
He takes as an example The 1997 Regulations for the Examination of Doctrines from the Roman Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. It’s 1500 words, 29 articles, and describes the process by which a doctrine in circulation may be judged “erroneous or dangerous to the faith” by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (e.g., the smackdown of a theologian).
These regulations say that the bishop has the right and duty to “exercise pastoral solicitude” but that the Holy See “has the power to intervene, and intends to intervene, whenever a publication constitutes a grave danger for the faith and the impact reaches beyond the boundaries of a local episcopal conference.” (p. 92) Today, this could be any publication on the planet.
Secular legal wisdom says:
“Justice demands a precise definition of an offense”
“The Regulations name two offenses, namely the spreading of ‘erroneous doctrine’ and ‘dangerous doctrine.’ Both are two broad for comfort.
“Erroneous” or “dangerous” doctrine is much too vague a definition of an offence. “Totalitarian states like to have crimes broadly defined …” (p. 97)
“’Erroneous doctrine’ can have different meanings in the realm of religious beliefs and opinions. Catholic theology has always carefully distinguished revealed doctrine (‘articles of faith’) from theological opinions held by scholars or some church officials. They are not of the same category. If a proposition is judged erroneous, to understand the gravity of the error one must know the authority of the ‘truth’ that it denies. Vatican Council II insisted on a ‘hierarchy of truths,’ with each truth demanding assent to a specific degree, yet the Regulations use one broad category that opens the door for a uniform prosecution of errors, whether major or minor. There is a difference between obstinate rejection of an article of faith and thoughtful opposition to an opinion held by an office of the Holy See.
“The expression ‘dangerous doctrine’ gives an even larger scope to the investigators: with it they can reach far and wide as it has no firm and objective limits. … the perception of a danger can be subjective and deceptive: much depends on the mind of the observer.” (p. 97)
“Justice is best served when the respective roles of the judge, the prosecutor, and the defendant’s advocate are kept separate”
“If the office of the investigator appoints all of them, the balance of the trial is disturbed and the objectivity of the decision is questioned. … In the Regulations, this well-established separation of the roles is not honored. The same organs of the Congregation are involved in, or can influence on the initial investigation, the articulation of the charges, the defense of the writings and of the author, and eventually the final decision.” (p. 97)
“Equity, the perfection of justice, demands that each of the opposing parties has a similar opportunity to plead before the judge.”
“The Regulations grant different measures, far from any equal amount of time, to the accuser and the defender. During the first part of the ordinary process when the crucial decision is taken about the conformity of the author’s writings to the demands of orthodoxy, he is absent. He is not even informed that a process has been initiated.
“Another glaring lack of equity (to say the least) emerges when the outcome of the examination is negative, and the Congregation finds the author’s propositions ‘erroneous or dangerous.’” The bishop or superior is informed, reputations can be ruined, and the author may still not know he has been accused.
“Our church has nothing to lose and much to gain by offering the elementary courtesy to Christian thinkers to explain their mind right from the moment when suspicion arises against their writings. (p. 98-9)
The presumption of innocence
“The ‘principle of the presumption of innocence’ is an inviolable part of the criminal proceedings in modern legal systems. Such a presumption, however, is not mentioned in the Regulations. (p. 99)
Justice demands openness
“The virtue of justice, as integrated with faith, hope, and love among Christians, is a powerful factor in forging unity in the community. For this reason, it is never enough to do justice, it must be done publicly. The people should see that justice is done. … “The Regulations fall short of the standards of an open trial. In particular, the first part of the ordinary proceedings is shrouded in complete secrecy.” (p. 100)
An extreme penalty
“Excommunication is an extreme penalty in a Christian community. But “The Regulations ignore a crucial problem: the crime of heresy is an ‘obstinate denial’ of an article of faith (Canon 751); it is a surrender to falsehood while one sees the light. … it is not an ordinary event. Even if it has been established that the writings of a person contain heretical propositions, it does not follow necessarily that he is guided by a perverse intention. To rush into the imposition of an extreme sentence (perhaps without ever having listened to the author) can hardly be the sign and symbol of justice–let alone Christian mercy.” (p. 101-2)
The opportunity for appeal is an integral part of any good judicial system
“The Regulations are clear: once the Congregation has declared that the author is guilty of heresy, apostasy, or schism, the author must be held excommunicated, and ‘against such a declaration no recourse is admitted.’ The Explanatory Notes provide the following reason: throughout the process the pope himself is involved: hence, there cannot be any room for appeal. The underlying assumption seems to be that throughout, papal infallibility somehow plays a part in the process and, at the end, seals the sentence. But Catholic theology allows no such assumption. To exclude, therefore, any possibility of a miscarriage of justice would be presumptuous.
“At this point the Regulations reveal a substantial structural weakness: they create a first instance tribunal that, in the course of the same trial, becomes a supreme court.” (p. 101)
Conclusion
“In the Catholic world, the best way to promote and safeguard the doctrine of faith is to create a climate of trust where the process described by St. Anselm of Canterbury as fides quaerens intellectum, ‘faith seeking understanding,’ can flourish. Such a search for understanding is carried out mostly (but not exclusively) by professional theologians. To attract young and talented persons to choose theological research and reflection as their vocation, to strengthen those who are already dedicated to that work, and to lift the spirit of those who are struggling with the hard issues of our days, an environment of freedom and confidence is indispensable, a condicio sine qua non. Such an environment cannot exist if investigations, accusations, and even condemnations are allowed to take place in secrecy.
“Creative thinkers who scrutinize the divine mysteries and give us a language to speak about them must be constantly aware that the church trusts them and protects them. If norms are needed to prevent deviations, norms are even more necessary to secure freedom for creative thinking.” (p. 103)
“In truth, creative thinkers are one of the greatest assets of the church: they let the internal riches of the evangelical message unfold. … This was the ministry of Friar Thomas Aquinas and of Cardinal John Henry Newman.” (p. 103)
“The judicial procedures of the Regulations are of human origin. They are not rooted in any divine precept. They are the product of another age, not suited for our ecumenical times. To reform such procedures would be to obey Vatican Council II: Christ summons the church, as she goes her pilgrim way, to that continual reformation of which she always has need, insofar as she is a human institution here on earth (UR 6).” (p. 103-4)
This situation is untenable. A church that proports to fight against injustice in the world cannot tolerate injustice inside of itself. As Garry Wills says, it is “self-condemned.”
Tags: canon law, Orsy, structures of governance
“A reasonable and legitimate question: Why is there throughout the Catholic Church so much aversion to canon law? A tentative answer: because our people, blessed with a sense of faith, instinctively sense that some (many?) of our laws are not in the service of values of higher order.” (p. 81)
So he suggests a thorough revision based on solid theological grounds:
“A comprehensive critical study of the relationship between the values asserted by the Council and the postconciliar legislation remains to be done. We are far from having accomplished an authentic aggiornamento of our canon law. Nevertheless, I can think of two significant initiatives toward progress that are immediately feasible. One is in the realm of theory and the other in the field of practice.
“1. In preparation for a future revision of the Code of Canon Law, we should have a group of competent and dedicated theologians and canon lawyers that work closely together to identify afresh the theological values that need legal support. The result of their study could be submitted to the (future) pontifical commission charged with reviewing the whole system. [me - or bishop’s commission] If such a preparatory work is well done, and if it is made public, it would be difficult to ignore it. [me - !!!] Its content would give it authority. That is a worthy challenge for a professional Canon Law Society.
“2. In the field of practice, the reform should start with the administration of justice. We should make our courts autonomous (as much as possible without hurting any dogma) and start dispensing fair and speedy justice. The doctrine of sacramentally conferred episcopal power need not exclude operational independence. What an asset it would be for a new evangelization if the Catholic Church had the reputation of being exemplary to the nations in the administration of justice!” (p. 89-90)
Indeed. Instead of the opposite.
Tags: canon law
Here’s what he has to say about Vatican II and canon law. It is not “petty regulations for the vexation of the faithful.” Its purpose is to create freedom, like the way in which the rule of law creates freedom in modern societies. But Canon Law has not evolved to reflect the theology of Vatican II.
The relationship between theology and canon law is as follows: “Theology operates on the abstract level. It has priority at the planning stage; it determines a value to be appropriated; it gives meaning to the law. Canon law operates on the concrete level. … In the church, canon law has an importance that no theory can match. It deals with the real existing social body. But a law not grounded in a value is like a house built on sand; it is bound to collapse.” (p. 79)
“… the true foundation of any theological enterprise is in wisdom that speaks of ineffable mysteries apprehended by faith. Such wisdom should play a principal role in discovering Christian values that the community should appropriate. This is to say that an intuitive sensus fidei, or a ‘supernatural instinct,’ should be numbered among the sources of canon law.” (p. 78)
Canon law has lost its vital link with theology: “In 1564, after the Council of Trent, to safeguard the integrity of the Council’s decisions, Pope Pius IV forbade the publication of any ‘commentaries, glossaries, annotations, scholia, or interpretations of any kind concerning the Council’s decrees. This was the beginning of ‘canonical nominalism.’ … With one stroke … the great tradition of ‘raising questions’ that animated research in the Middle Ages was terminated.”
It has become static and unchanging: “Every legal system must include provision for the ongoing renewal of the law. Civic communities … have legislatures sensitive to the needs of the community. In the church we have the Code, but, in practice, no organism endowed with the specific task of detecting emerging needs and proposing changes. Serious problems remain unresolved, tensions develop; these tensions lead to crises, and finally the situation explodes.” (p. 82)
“This is exactly what happened when the crisis of sexual abuse descended on the church. It was coming for some time, and there was no adequate preventive legislation. A sensible system of the ‘visitation of diocese’ by outside observers able to interview the people, the clergy, and the bishop separately could have discovered the problems much earlier.” (p. 82)
It has cut itself off from secular (human) wisdom: “Ever since the Renaissance, humanistic secular jurisprudence has made immense strides in such matters as freedom of conscience, respect for human rights, impartial courts, speedy administration of justice, responsibility for the common welfare, and so on. Canon law remained mostly untouched by such developments; … they are innocent of modernity. On the basis of knowledge gained from them, no one could carry on an intelligent conversation about the law with a well-intentioned contemporary secular thinker.” ouch. (p. 83)
But just like the Council failed to create any serious ongoing structures for collegiality, it seems the progressives pretty much blew off the whole domain of canon law. “Opus Dei, on the other hand, fostered the cultivation of this discipline; the University of Navarre became the seedbed for a school of canonists, and from the very moment of the creation of the Committee on the Revision of Canon Law, Opus Dei took an active role in it.” (p. 86)
The norms in the 1983 Revised Code of Canon Law have been “shaping the church and directing its operations.” (p. 87) But canon law reflects a pre-Vatican II view of the church. “Today, after the Constitution on Divine Revelation (Dei verbum), when virtually the whole church peacefully accepts that there is a development in doctrine, not to accept that there can be a development in the interpretation and application of the laws is an indefensible position.” (p. 58)
Basically, he’s saying things are as they were.
Centralization – the Synod of Bishops is merely consultative; episcopal conferences have no collegial power; the non-ordained cannot by law share in the governance of the church.
Legal positivism, canonical nominalism – the link is weakening between the law and the theological values it is supposed to engender.
Acceptance of a historical existence – “… we have no means built into the system for the renewal of our laws. We do not have an organ specifically entrusted with the particular task of watching great cultural movements, assessing the emerging needs, and proposing changes in the law accordingly.” Ditto inability to respond to the pedophilia crisis.
Learning from secular sages – “In the Middle Ages, the study of canon law went hand in hand with the cult of civil law: they shared whatever wisdom they could find. The Reformation and Enlightenment put an end to this partnership, and canon law remained alone and did not benefit from the significant progress in legal wisdom achieved in civic communities. To a large extent, this continues to be the case today.” (p. 89)
Tags: canon law, Orsy, structures of governance
Most of us don’t usually get fired up about the topic of canon law but it is the operations manual for the church so if there is to be change in the structure of the church it will happen in the domain of canon law. Orsy has some very interesting things to say about reception of canon law and the underlying theology of this reception. This is a long post but worth the read for anyone interested in Church reform.
Orsy widens the context of the understanding of canon law by stipulating that you not only have to look at what the laws are, but how they are received (e.g., whether people pay attention to them). Given the situation today, that Church authorities no longer legitimize belief because the truth of belief has passed from the institution to the believer, this is a very apt discussion.
He says we need to talk about how laws are received because “those in authority are less and less able to issue peremptory commands and obtain facile compliance.” You can say that again. “People, within and without the church, want to know the reason for a law; they want to understand the good that it intends to achieve; they want to implement it intelligently and freely. Such an attitude is no more than an assertion of human dignity, a stance that the church, no doubt, wishes to honor.” (p. 57) Well ya’d think.
His focus is to figure out the correct theological pattern of reception, because you can look at reception (or non-reception) as information to determine whether you should think about reversing laws that have not been received. The poster child for this is Humanae Vitae but it is not the only example.
He reminds us that the church is organic and unfinished. “It is like a growing human being: to live, develop, and prosper, it needs to reach out for those things that can nourish its life–we call them values. The purpose of laws is to prompt the community to appropriate those values; the reception of the laws is the process by which the community comes into the possession of the same values. (The laws speak of intended values; reception means the acquisition of values.) (p. 60)
The Abstract and the Practical
Orsy describes how the reception of laws is an exercise in communio.
He says laws are abstract, like designs, but they are “received and implemented in the concrete world of human history.” (p. 55) “The overall priority, however, belongs to the world of existence because God is existence itself. The reception of laws takes place in the existential world, the place of concrete, particular and personal events. There the people of God can turn an abstract, universal, and impersonal norm into a force of life that help sustain and nourish the community.” (p. 56)
Then he compares the reception of laws to the building of a cathedral. “The process of building was the act of reception. In the church, the lawgivers are like the architects. The law-abiding people are like the builders.”
He points out the primacy of the existential: “the cathedrals could never exist without the laborers, no matter how good the designs may have been. The living body of the church could never function without those who are putting into practice its norms, laws, and rules, no matter how well such directives are conceived.” (p. 56)
“In this living church, the reception of laws takes place in the existential order where the energies of life flow, where historical events succeed each other, and where intelligent and free persons are called on to make responsible decisions.” (p. 59-60)
Lawgivers and Receiver
Effectively the lawgivers are the pope and the bishops. The lawgiver exists for the community. “Whatever he has, including the special charism of his office, he has it for the sake of the whole.” (p. 61)
“The receivers are the people of God: grace-filled, intelligent, and free persons.” But their first obligation is to God. “A Christian is bound to God by a “from-person-to-person” obligation. All duties that emerge in his or her life are specifications of this unique overriding bond. (This is really the best key to understanding the nature of canon law: it specifies an already existing personal obligation in the faithful. For this reason, even if canon law looks like civil law and can be studied as civil law, it can never be received in the same fashion as civil law. A Christian subject always responds to his or her personal God.”) (p. 63)
What is Reception?
“… a dynamic process brought forward by those immense energies that circulate in the community of the faithful. They are moved by a desire implanted by the Creator into the human heart to seek the good …” (p. 65)
It is an integrated process:
1) perception of the law
2) quest for understanding – what is the value that the law intends to promote
3) “The third movement in the process is its climax: the law meets the conscience of the receiver. It reaches that luminous part of the person where he or she is bound to God. There, a sovereign judgment will have to be made over the law, a judgment for which the person responsible to his or her Maker and to no one else.” (p. 66)
If there is disharmony for whatever reason, the conflict must be resolved before any action is taken. “The gist of this doctrine is the affirmation of the primacy of conscience over the law: no Christian must hold otherwise.” (p. 66)
4) “The fourth movement follows after the conscience has accepted the law and has integrated its demands with the obligation that binds the person to God. The lawgiver’s intention becomes the receiver’s decision. He or she is willing to act, that is, to reach out for the value that the law wants. This is, before and above all, an obsequium to God, ‘honoring God,’ and only secondarily an act of obedience to the law.” (p. 67)
5) “The fifth movement on the part of the receiver is then the action itself, the implementation of the law in the world of concrete, particular, and personal events.” (p. 67)
When Law Meets Life
When law meets life, “This is a new moment in the life of the law. For the first time, the abstract norm meets the turmoil of concrete events. The law is tried in the crucible of life, as an old saying in jurisprudence goes.” (p. 68)
There may be harmony or there may be conflict. “It arises when the law imposes an action for the acquisition of one value, but in the concrete order the same action is destructive of another value.” Bingo. (p. 68)
“An easily recognizable sign that the reception is going well is peace in the community. The purpose of a law is always to bring order into the life and operations of a group. When the law does this, and does it in the right measure, the group responds with contentment. … When the opposite happens–that is, the process of reception triggers restlessness, discontent, even resistance–in a well-informed, intelligent and responsible community, it is time to examine anew the suitability of that piece of legislation.” (p. 69)
“When, on the wake of the reception, joy and gladness abound, the concentration on faith, hope, and love increases, and the sense of unity is strengthened, then the law is doing good service to the community. For good people to have wise laws is a liberating experience. Contrarywise, if a law brings sadness and sorrow, distraction from the exhilarating experience of God’s presence, and undue preoccupation with temporal structures and institutions, it is time to question the law.” (p. 69-70) Bingo.
The Process of Reception in Light of Vatican II
The following insights of Vatican II are key to the understanding of the process of reception of laws that he has laid out.
The priority of the people of God – “…the concept of ‘people’ comprehends all, the hierarchy and the laity. Besides, a body is always prior to any of its members, even to the head. The same spirit animates my discourse: the need to recognize the priority of the people of God in building the church.” (p. 70)
The sensus fidei, sense of faith of the people – “The Council describes how the people share in the prophetic office of Christ, how they have the capacity to penetrate their faith with correct judgment, and apply it more fully to daily life (see LG12). (p. 71)
The historical character of the revelation – “The Word of God, eternal and immutable, has entered into our universe, temporal and changeable. The word has, therefore, a historical character; the Constitution on Divine Revelation (Dei verbum) leaves no doubt about that. If that much is true of the Word itself, how much more it must be true of the human laws in the church!” (p. 71)
The primacy of conscience – “The Council articulated clearly–with all due qualifications– the absolute primacy of the dictates of conscience. Yet, the far-reaching implications of this doctrine concerning the obligations of the faithful within the church have received scant attention in theological writings.” (p. 71) Indeed ~ we need to get up off our collective asses.
The correct hierarchy of virtues – “Innumerable texts could be quoted from the Council to show how it honors the supremacy of the theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. All other virtues are organically subordinated to these three.”
“Obedience to a human law (even if it is ecclesiastical law) cannot be a supreme virtue: obedience can be authentic only when it functions in subordination to the theological virtues.” (p. 71) amen.
“What we need now is to find the concrete criteria to judge actual processes of reception as they take place in the existential order so that we can differentiate between authentic acts and aberrations. Inspiration for finding such criteria could be found in Congar’s well-known work True and False Reform in the Church; the reception of a law, too, could be true or false. Relevant material could be gathered also from Newman’s Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine: more than half of the work is on the question of how genuine developments can be distinguished from corruptions.” (p. 72-3)
Tags: canon law, Orsy, structures of governance
I love the things he thinks are interesting:
“This is an interesting topic for a creative inquiry: How can the church (always a faithful trustee of divine revelation) best honor human dignity in its members? What kind of moral obligations exist, what sorts of legal norms could best serve this purpose? The underlying assumption of any such inquiry is that to honor the dignity of human persons is to honor God.” (p. 57)
Well ya’d think.
“An interesting question: Do office holders have a moral duty to give an account to the community about the use of the power? Since the community consists of intelligent and free persons, it seems fitting (it appears to be of good order) that the community should hear from the officeholders how the common needs are served; they are the community’s needs, after all.” (p. 61)
A a moral duty to give an account to the community about the use of power, indeed.
Tags: canon law, Orsy
Since so much in the church depends on canon law, one wonders how it is changed. Is it passed by a group of legislators? Is it ultimately judged by an institution similar to a supreme court? Nope. As things stand today, the Pope exercises supreme legislative, executive, and judicial power in the church. There is no separation of powers, no built-in checks and balances.
There is nothing equivalent to a legislature. If a truly collegial Synod of Bishops existed, this would represent the voice that a legislature represents in a democracy. The last time the bishops exercised their collective collegial power was almost 50 years ago, during Vatican II.
There is also no equivalent of a separate judiciary in the oldest continuously functioning legal system in the Western world. Judicial power is exercised by the equivalent of the executive branch, in the various congregations ( in particular the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) and tribunals of the Roman Curia. The Pope is considered the supreme ecclesiastical judge. If he wants to change the Code of Canon Law, he does so without the advice or consent of the bishops, typically by promulgating a papal letter, which effects the change.
Pope John Paul II did just this when he issued the document Ad tuendam fidem, which created a brand new category of doctrine called “definitive doctrine,”TO PROTECT THE FAITH of the Catholic Church against errors arising from certain members of the Christian faithful, especially from among those dedicated to the various disciplines of sacred theology …”
Apostolic Letter Motu Proprio AD TUENDAM FIDEM, by which certain norms are inserted into the Code of Canon Law and into the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches
Such is life in the divine right monarchy that is the Church. More on this in a bit.
Tags: canon law
Here he describes how a new canon law excludes the laity from governance of the church.
“On the one hand, the pronouncements of Vatican Council II brought remarkable results and opened the door for an increased promotion of the laity. On the other hand, the official policy of the church based on a recent theological opinion that found its way into the revised Code of Canon Law excludes the laity from any major decision-making processes–reversing an immemorial tradition.” (p. 35)
“… the Council acknowledged the right of the laity to proclaim the Good News and to witness for Christ on the strength of their baptism, without any need ‘to be mandated by the hierarchy.’ … After the Council, however, a new provision in canon law (Canon 129) moved in the opposite direction. It excluded laypersons from significant decision-making processes where ecclesiastical ‘jurisdiction’ is in play. … In sum, no layperson is admitted ‘into the inner sanctuary’ that is to have a significant role in building the church from within.” (p. 38)
It did this by stating that only those who receive sacred orders (e.g., are ordained) are qualified for the power of governance; lay people can only “cooperate” in the exercise of this power.
Here is the Canon.
“Such a neat and radical exclusion of the laity from any participation in the power of governance is discontinuous with an immemorial tradition.” Then he points out that lay people participated in the ecumenical councils of the first millennium, participated in the Council of Florence, abbesses had “power of jurisdiction,” etc. “History is not on the side of Canon 129. Therefore, the restriction can hardly be grounded in dogma.” (p. 39)
“Until 1972 tonsure, not ordination, made a cleric. In the new regime ordination to the diaconate does it. Tonsure was a purely ritual act, not a sacrament; the theological status of the tonsured person remained exactly what it was. he continued to be a layperson. Yet from the moment he received the tonsure he could participate (and many did) in the exercise of the power of governance … which is now the exclusive domain of the ordained persons.” (p. 41)
“If the present situation becomes a norm for the future, the church will be more clerical than it ever was. Since the laity will have no part in any major decision-making office or process, much of their God-given gifts and talents will lay fallow. The hierarchy will stress to them that obedience ought to be their principal virtue. Sure, the laity will be promoted in many minor ways, but the line between the ordained and non-ordained will remain sharply drawn.
“In particular, no woman will ever have the opportunity (or capacity) to have a share in major decision-making processes–not even when the subject matter of a decision does not require the sacramental power of ordination.
“We need to think afresh.” (p. 41-2)
He says that the idea of “the laity” as a separate category is meaningless because we never “become” lay people at any point and you wouldn’t define a group by what it’s not (e.g., not the ordained). So he says “in order to understand the place and role of the laity in the church, we must not look at the laity as a distinct unit in the church. We must focus on the entire people as a whole.” (p. 43)
Lay people could and should be voting members of synods or councils, be members of decision-making bodies in the Curia, be in charge of the administration of the assets in the church, or (if qualified) be preachers. The basis for all this is baptism.
Tags: canon law, Orsy, structures of governance
This post lays out Orsy’s thoughts on collegiality, especially on how the collegial vision of Vatican II has been compromised by John Paul II’s apostolic letter Apostolos suos.
This apostolic letter creates a definition and framework for episcopal conferences (i.e., territorial associations of Bishops like the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops). Since by this letter they are constituted by the papacy, they serve at the pleasure of the papacy, their power flows from the papacy, they are regulated by the papacy and their actions must conform to the intentions of the papacy.
Yet “Vatican Council II was form in asserting that bishops are not the delegates of the pope. But if the Holy See creates their conferences and has the exclusive right to invest them with collegiate power, it surely follows that much of their effective power is given to them by the same See; that is, their effective power originates in the office of the pope.”(p. 17)
However, Apostolos suos does recognize the power of the full episcopal college (i.e., a meeting of all the bishops in an ecumenical council) to speak with an inspired voice, which is consistent with the theologically recognized way in which the Holy Spirit guides the Church. And if the bishops meet in legitimate but partial gatherings, they maintain the power of their collegial voice and the recognized guidance of the Holy Spirit. Yet Apostolos suos declares that if these legitimate, partial gatherings of bishops happen to meet regularly based on territory (e.g., the regular meetings of all the bishops in the US), their collegial power and guidance by the Holy Spirit is not recognized. Apostolos suos treats such regular, territorial meetings of bishops essentially as papal committees whose work is subject to papal review and approval unless one hundred percent of the bishops vote to agree on the matter under question. Even a vast majority of bishops agreeing on a teaching is insufficient to avoid the need for papal review and approval on the work of the bishops in conference.
“The consequences are far reaching. Although within the same cultural region it is a theological necessity for the bishops to deliberate and decide together (otherwise their contribution to the church’s diversity remains ineffective), the moment they wish to work as a collective body, they can do so only as an institution created by the Holy See. While it is Catholic doctrine that individual bishops are not delegates of the Holy See, their conferences exist and operate on the basis of a power granted by the Holy See. (p. 22)
Gotta love it. Here’s a copy of Apostolos suos.
An alternative to Apostolos suos
“… the universal law should acknowledge the fundamental right and duty of the bishops, flowing from their ordination, to assemble for pastoral purposes. This must not be a concession from the Holy See; it can only be an affirmation of what exists by divine institution. … The Holy See can and should retain the ultimate supervisory authority over the conferences but more in the manner of a court of appeal (which is very traditional) than in the way of an ever-present director of all their actions. …On careful analysis, the structures and norms recently imposed by the Holy See on the episcopal conferences do not conceal but rather reveal a deep theological imbalance in the life of the church: the function of the episcopate has been taken over to a great extent by the primacy. This is the truth.” (p. 30)
Tags: canon law, Orsy, structures of governance
This post discusses Orsy’s take on communio, the theological underpinning of all forms of organization in the Church.
The bishops at Vatican II “ … stated that the church was first and foremost a ‘communion,’ communio, a union of persons in a unique sense–created by the Spirit of Christ. … Briefly but substantially, this is the theological reality of communio. All external manifestations of unity, such as collegiality and solidarity, flow from it.” (p. 4,5)
“This spiritual communio is an ontological reality and the origin and prototype of any other communio in the church. It is not a hypothesis; it is not an opinion. It belongs to the core of Catholic doctrine.” (p. 6-7)
Ordination incorporates a person into the communio of “servant shepherds” which includes bishops, priests and deacons. Orsy says they are a community not a military organization. “None of the three orders alone has the full intelligence and prudence needed for the proper care of a local church (a diocese). The bishop needs others to govern the diocese.”
“To have a priests’ council is not a concession; it is a theological necessity.” (p. 8 )
The Bishops have their own communio – the college of bishops, with the Pope as its head. But since the 12th century the church has evolved a centralization that gives the pope powers above and beyond those as head of the college of bishops. The Orthodox church doesn’t have this structure. But it’s not just the papacy that needs reforming; bishops, priests and the rest of us need to take responsibility. The whole church needs to be reformed. “…reform in the exercise of primacy is possible only if it is balanced by corresponding transformations within the community at large.” (p. 12)
“Gregory VII is remembered for having initiated a movement toward a strong centralized government. Perhaps in a millennium from now, John XXIII will be remembered for having changed the course of events and set the church on the path of communio. Blessed be his name.” (p. 15)
Tags: canon law, Orsy, structures of governance
Being a canon lawyer, Fr. Orsy talks a lot about canon law, and I for one was not totally clear on what that actually was, so I nosed around a little bit:
“Canon law is the body of laws and regulations made by or adopted by ecclesiastical authority, for the government of the Christian organization and its members. …
The Roman Catholic Church has the oldest continuously functioning legal system in the Western world, predating the common and European civil law traditions. What began with rules (“canons”) adopted by the Apostles at the Council of Jerusalem in the 1st century has blossomed into a highly complex and original legal system encapsulating not just norms of the New Testament, but some elements of the Hebrew (Old Testament), Roman, Visigothic, Saxon, and Celtic legal traditions spanning thousands of years of human experience.”
From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canon_law
The code of canon law contains over 1700 canons or statements (typically about a sentence to a paragraph in length), that contain the laws, structures, and operational procedures of the church. For example, Canon 380, describing the appointment of a bishop by the Supreme Pontiff, says: “Before he takes canonical possession of his office, the one promoted is to make the profession of faith and take the oath of fidelity to the Apostolic See according to the formula approved by the Apostolic See.”
The canons are about canon law itself; about the power of governance including ecclesiastical offices; about the Christian faithful including the obligations and rights of all Christian faithful and the formation of clerics; about the hierarchical constitution of the church including the supreme authority of the church, the roman pontiff, the college of bishops, the synod of bishops, and the roman curia; about bishops and the organization of diocese; about religious orders; about how the church teaches, celebrates the sacraments and organizes sacred places and times; about the temporal goods of the church; and about how the church delivers sanctions and penalties, organizes trials, and manages other penal processes.
See the real thing at the Vatican Web site.
Tags: canon law
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